Policy models and policy instruments in higher education.  The effects of governmental policy-making on the innovative behaviour of higher education institutions.  IHS Political Science Series 26, October 1995 by van Vught, Frans A.
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna 
   Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series  No. 26 
POLICY MODELS AND POLICY INSTRUMENTS IN 
HIGHER EDUCATION 
THE EFFECTS OF GOVERNMENTAL POLICY-MAKING ON THE 
INNOVATIVE BEHAVIOUR OF HIGHER EDUCATION INSTITUTIONS 
Frans A. van Vught I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 1 
 
 I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 2 
 
Policy Models and Policy Instruments  
in Higher Education 
The Effects of Governmental Policy-Making on the  
Innovative Behaviour of Higher Education  
Institutions 
 
 
Frans A. van Vught 
 
 
Reihe Politikwissenschaft / Political Science Series No. 26 
 
 
October 1995 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Centre for Higher Education Policy Studies (CHEPS) 
University of Twente 
Fax: 0031 53/34 03 92 
* IAS visiting professor April 1995 
 
Institut für Höhere Studien (IHS), Wien 
Institute for Advanced Studies, Vienna I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Die Reihe Politikwissenschaft wird von der Abteilung Politologie des Instituts für Höhere Studien 
(IHS) in Wien herausgegeben. Ziel dieser Publikationsreihe ist, abteilungsinterne Arbeitspapiere 
einer breiteren fachinternen Öffentlichkeit und Diskussion zugänglich zu machen. Die inhaltliche 
Verantwortung für die veröffentlichten Beiträge liegt bei den AutorInnen. Gastbeiträge werden als 
solche gekennzeichnet. 
 
Alle Rechte vorbehalten I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 4 
 
Abstract 
This article presents the major theoretical frameworks regarding governmental policy-making in 
the field of higher education. It first discusses two basic and general “policy models”, after 
which these models are specified for the policy context of higher education. In addition, an 
overview is presented of the various policy instruments that can be used by governments with 
respect to public sector regulation.  
In the second part of this article the policy models and policy instruments are evaluated from 
the perspective of their capacity to stimulate innovations in the field of higher education. 
Zusammenfassung 
Der Artikel stellt im ersten Teil die wichtigsten theoretischen Konzepte zur politischen 
Regulierung im Bereich der Hochschulpolitik dar.  Zuerst werden zwei grundlegende und 
allgemeine “Politikmodelle” analysiert, die dann für den Kontext der Hochschulpolitik 
spezifiziert werden. Darüberhinaus wird ein Überblick über Politikinstrumente geboten, die zur 
Regulierung des öffentlichen Sektors prinzipiell zur Verfügung stehen.  Im zweiten Teil des 
Artikels werden die Politikmodelle und -instrumente im Hinblick auf ihre Fähigkeit untersucht, 
Innovationen im Hochschulbereich zu fördern. 
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Note 
Note that with the changed outer appearance of this issue, the IAS Political Science Series is 
making an invaluable contribution to political philosophy. It confirms, in a convincing, decisive, 
and even heroic manner, that all assumptions regarding the certainty, linearity, and 
irresistibility of social progress are misguided as well as misleading. Any attentive reader will 
have noticed, shuddering with admiration, the truly remarkable deterioration of the series’ 
aesthetic standards, the dramatic, precipitous decline of its visual quality. Yet, the new design 
of the series, the optical shock program it is implementing, must not lead readers to erroneous 
conclusions regarding its substantive program. Against all appearances, the renowned high 
academic quality of the Political Science Series will be strictly maintained. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 6 
 
Contents 
Vorwort des Herausgebers   1 
1.  Introduction   3 
2.  Policy Models   4 
2.1.  The Policy Model of Rational Planning and Control   5 
2.2.  The Policy Model of Self-Regulation   6 
3.  Policy Models in Higher Education   8 
3.1.  The State Control Model   9 
3.2  The State Supervising Model   10 
4.  Policy Instruments   11 
5.  The Study of Innovation   19 
5.1.  Fundamental Characteristics of Higher Education Institutions   21 
5.2  Innovations in Higher Education   24 
5.3  Organizational Variables Related to Success of Innovations   24 
5.4  Characteristics of Successful Innovations   29 
6.  Conclusion   36 
7.  References   41 I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 7 
 
Vorwort des Herausgebers 
In Österreich wurden Anfang der 90er Jahre erste Schritte gesetzt, das Bildungssystem - 
insbesondere das Hochschulwesen  - umzugestalten. Beinahe im Gleichschritt wurden 1993 
das Universitätsorganisationsgesetz reformiert und das Gesetz über Fachhochschul-
Studiengänge erlassen. Beide Gesetze folgen den Leitlinien einer Erhöhung der Autonomie der 
Hochschuleinrichtungen, der Deregulierung im Sinne der Reduzierung von Zahl und Umfang 
von gesetzlichen Vorgaben und einer Dezentralisierung von Entscheidungskompetenzen. All 
dies geschieht im Umfeld reduzierter budgetärer Spielräume, erhöhter und veränderter 
Ansprüche an hochschulische Qualifikationen und verstärkter Konkurrenz in einem sich 
entwickelnden europäischen Forschungs- und Bildungsmarkt.  
In den proklamierten Leitlinien spiegelt sich sowohl eine Abkehr von den Prämissen der 
Hochschulpolitik der letzten 25 Jahre als auch die Annäherung der österreichischen 
Hochschulpolitik an die in vielen Staaten Europas vorherrschenden Tendenzen.  Die 
Hochschulpolitik der v ergangenen Jahrzehnte war von der Vorstellung geprägt, daß der Staat 
berufen und zugleich dazu in der Lage wäre, die Entwicklung der Hochschulen zu steuern, die 
“Demokratisierung” des Bildungssystems zu bewerkstelligen und Chancengleichheit über die 
formale Öffnung des Zugangs herzustellen. Die Sorge um die Studienqualität, das Verhältnis 
von Studieninhalt und beruflicher Praxis, die Qualität und Internationalität der universitären 
Forschung, aber auch die Sorge um die ökonomische Effizienz und Effektivität der 
hochschulischen Einrichtungen mußte dagegen zurückstehen. Das zeitliche Zusammentreffen 
der Vorbereitungen zum Beitritt Österreichs zur Europäischen Union mit den Plänen zur 
Reform des Hochschulwesens legen die Vermutung nahe, daß es nicht die unbewältigten 
Probleme und Mißstände in der Universität allein waren, die die neuerliche Reformoffensive 
auslösten.  Die externen Herausforderungen für das österreichischen Universitätssystem 
können allerdings nur Anstoß sein, notwendige Strukturreformen durch- und umzusetzen.  
Vergleicht man die programmatischen Ansprüche mit den bisher vorliegenden Resultaten, so 
kommt man nicht umhin festzustellen, daß im Universitätsbereich die Reformen in den 
Anfängen steckenzubleiben drohen, während das im Aufbau befindliche Fachhochschulsystem 
als zukunftsweisendes Modell und bildungspolitisches Experiment gelten kann, für das es im 
österreichischen Bildungswesen kein Vorbild gibt. Die Veränderung der formalen Organisation 
stellt allerdings bestenfalls einen ersten Reformschritt dar, der von tiefgreifenden 
Veränderungen in den Rahmenbedingungen der Finanzierung, des Dienstrechtes, der 
Studiengestaltung und der Qualitätssicherung ergänzt werden muß, um einen 
Selbstregelungsmechanismus in Gang zu setzen, der zu einer neuen Balance im Verhältnis 
von Hochschulen und Staat, Lehrenden und Studierenden, Studium und Beruf, Forschung und 
gesellschaftlichen Bedürfnissen führen kann.  Der Erfolg des in dieser Hinsicht für das 
österreichische Hochschulsystem revolutionären Regelungsmechanismus im 
Fachhochschulbereich wird mit darüber entscheiden, ob das österreichischen I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 8 
 
Hochschulsystem wandlungsfähig genug ist, um sich den alten und neuen Herausforderungen 
zu stellen. 
Der vorliegende Artikel von Prof. van Vught kann als Folie dafür verwendet werden zu 
beurteilen, welche Schritte in der österreichischen Hochschulpolitik noch erforderlich sind, um 
die angestrebte “Autonomie” des Hochschulwesens umzusetzen und mit Substanz zu füllen. 
Prof. van Vught entwickelt seine These vom notwendigen Übergang vom Politikmodell der 
“staatlichen Kontrolle” zum Modell der “staatlichen Aufsicht” vor dem Hintergrund einer 
umfassenden Kenntnis der Hochschulsysteme Europas und darüberhinaus - sowohl was ihre 
Entwicklung als auch ihre inneren Funktionsbedingungen betrifft. Zudem entwickelt er seine 
Vorstellungen unter Berücksichtigung und in Hinblick auf die spezifischen 
kontinentaleuropäischen Traditionen der staatlichen Universitätsverwaltung und der in 
Kontinentaleuropa vorherrschenden Sichtweise der Hochschulausbildung als weitgehend 
öffentliches Gut.  Die Erhöhung der Autonomie der Hochschulen und Universitäten ist kein 
Selbstzweck, sondern dient den Zielen der Stärkung akademischer Professionalität, der 
Optimierung wissenschaftlicher Wissenserzeugung und  -vermittlung und der Erhöhung der 
generellen Innovationsfähigkeit von Universitäten und Hochschulen - allesamt Ziele, die für die 
gedeihliche Weiterentwicklung der Universitäten unverzichtbar sind. 
Wir danken Prof. van Vught und der Agathon Press für die Erlaubnis  zum Reprint des 
vorliegenden Artikels, der 1994 im “Higher Education: Handbook of Theory and Research, Vol. 
X” erschienen ist. 
Josef Melchior 
im Namen der Abteilung Politikwissenschaft   
Wien, September 1995 I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 9 
 
1. Introduction 
Government regulation has become an increasingly important issue. Much of the attention for 
government regulation has been focused on private sector regulation. Economists have widely 
analyzed the effects of government regulation on the affected market sector (for instance: 
Kahn, 1971; Stigler, 1975). 
The effects of public sector regulation have also attracted some attention. In disciplines like 
public administration and policy analysis, public sector regulation has fruitfully been studied as 
an issue of compliance or noncompliance. The literature on implementation processes in 
particular has offered some interesting results with respect to the identification of factors 
explaining why specific government policies have or have not succeeded (Pressman & 
Wildavsky, 1973; ; Dunsire, 1978; Rein & Rabinovitz, 1978; Bardach, 1979; Barrett & Fudge, 
1981; Mazmanian & Sabatier 1981; O'Toole, 1986). With respect to the implementation of 
higher education policies the study by Cerych and Sabatier (1986) should be mentioned. 
Generally speaking, regulation has to do with the influencing of behaviour, i.e. with trying to 
steer the decisions and actions of others according to certain objectives and by using certain 
instruments. Mitnick has defined ‘regulation' as ‘the intentional restriction of a subject's choice 
of activity, by an entity not directly part to or involved in that activity' (Mitnick, 1980, p. 5). 
Government regulation can be described as the efforts of government to steer the decisions 
and actions of specific societal actors according to the objectives the government has set and 
by using instruments government has at its disposal. There are three basic categories of 
rationale for government regulation: efficiency (usually pertaining to correcting market failures); 
distribution; and stimulating or protecting social and cultural objectives (Skolnik, 1987, p. 60). 
Government regulation can be interpreted as a ‘framework of rules within which other decision 
units can make decisions without the high transaction costs of maintaining private force for the 
purpose of protecting their belongings or of maintaining threats to enforce the carrying out of 
agreed upon contracts. As a framework, the government simply delineates the boundaries 
within which other units determine substantive choices, the government making its own forces 
available to defend the established boundaries' (Sowell, 1980, p. 145). 
In this article I will focus on these frameworks used by government in the policy field of higher 
education (Van Vught, 1991). I will especially discuss the general orientations that appear to 
guide the sets of rules that together form the frameworks of government regulation. 
When designing and implementing specific policies, governments are guided by general 
assumptions and points of view. For these assumptions and points of view I will use the term 
‘policy models'. ‘Policy models' are the sets of general postures, assumptions and guidelines 
that appear to be followed when governments formulate their frameworks of regulation. ‘Policy I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 10 
 
models' are – what Dror has called – : ‘megapolicies: a kind of master policies, clearly distinct 
from detailed discrete policies' (Dror, 1971, p. 63). 
In the following sections first two general policy models will be explored: the model of rational 
planning and control, and the model of self-regulation. These two models will then be specified 
in the policy context of higher education. Next, an overview will be presented of the policy 
instruments that can be used by governments with respect to public sector regulation. It will 
be argued that specific categories of policy instruments show a better fit with a specific policy 
model. 
In the second part of this article the policy models and policy instruments will be evaluated 
from the perspective of their capacity to stimulate innovations in the field of higher education. 
2. Policy Models 
Premfors (1992) has indicated that, when we accept the point of view that in policy analysis 
we should at least aim at a certain level of rationality, policy models like the ‘garbage can 
model' (March & Olsen, 1976) should not be considered to be part of policy analysis. 
Nevertheless, says Premfors, there is ‘a wealth of [what he calls] models of policy processes 
to choose from' (Premfors, 1992, p. 1908) He mentions models like ‘bounded rationality' 
(Simon, 1957), ‘mixed scanning' (Etzioni, 1968) and ‘the normative optimum model' (Dror, 
1968). Other models in the literature are the ‘incremental model' (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 
1963), the ‘systems model' (Jantsch, 1972), the ‘communicative model' (Van Gunsteren, 1976) 
and the ‘transactive model' (Friedmann, 1973) (see Maassen & Van Vught, 1992 for an 
overview). 
I argue that, when the basic assumptions of the various models that are presented in the 
literature are studied, only two clearly different models appear to remain. The other models 
that are found in the literature can all be seen as s pecific (and often quite interesting) 
variations or combinations of these two more or less fundamental models. 
2.1 The Policy Model of Rational Planning and Control 
An extreme case of a governmental approach to public sector regulation is one in which the 
knowledge of the object of regulation is assumed to be firm, the control over the object of 
regulation is presumed to be complete, and the self-image of the regulating subject is holistic. 
I will name this conception the policy model of rational planning and control. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 11 
 
A fundamental assumption of this model is that it should be performed as the normative ideal 
of the rationalist perspective on decision-making suggests: by comprehensively evaluating all 
conceivable consequences of all conceivable alternatives. 
The authors who can claim to have stated this strategy first in the literature are probably 
Meyerson and Banfield (Meyerson & Banfield, 1955). However, from their publications it also 
can be concluded that they want to see the model of rational decision-making as basically a 
normative ideal which is worthwhile to pursue but which cannot completely be realized in 
reality (Banfield, 1959; Meyerson, 1956):  
“... no choice can ever be perfectly rational, for there are usually a great – perhaps an infinite – 
number of possible actions open to the actor and the consequences of any one of them would 
ramify ad infinitum. No decision-maker could have the knowledge (or the time!) to evaluate 
even a small fraction of the actions open to him. It is possible, however, to be more or less 
systematic in the canvass of alternatives and consequences, so that the conception is not an 
entirely useless one. For practical purposes, a rational decision is one in which alternatives 
and consequences are considered as fully as the decision-maker, given the time and other 
resources available to him, can afford to consider them” (Banfield, 1959, p. 364). 
Lindblom especially has strongly criticized this model, variously called by him the rational-
deductive or the synoptic ideal (Lindblom, 1959; Lindblom, 1965; Braybrooke & Lindblom, 
1970). Lindblom argues against the rational decision-making ideal from the assertion that it 
cannot be followed in actual practice and that the attempts to do so distract decision-makers 
from a more feasible strategy (called by him the strategy of ‘disjointed incrementalism'). He 
argues that the ‘synoptic ideal' is not adapted to man's limited intellectual capacities, nor to 
his inadequacy of information or the costliness of analysis.  
“In actual fact, therefore, no one can practice the rational-comprehensive method for really 
complex problems, and every administrator faced with a sufficiently complex problem must 
find ways drastically to simplify” (Lindblom, 1959). 
Perhaps the most crucial aspect of Lindblom's criticism is his conviction that, given the limited 
knowledge a (governmental) policy-maker can acquire, comprehensive control of an object of 
regulation should not be strived after. A complete or nearly complete control cannot avoid 
harming the object of regulation and will eventually result in imposing decisions and 
commanding their implementation. Rather, according to Lindblom, decisions should rather be 
taken by a large number of decision-making units, each of them free to pursue its own 
interests. It is this conviction that leads Lindblom to speak of ‘disjointed' incrementalism.  
“Analysis and evaluation are disjointed in the sense that various aspects of public policy and 
even various aspects of any one problem or problem area are analyzed at various points, with I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 12 
 
no apparent co-ordination and without the articulation of parts that ideally characterises 
subdivision of topic in synoptic problem solving ... Disjointedness has its advantages (...) 
chief among them the advantage of preserving a rich variety of impressions and insights that 
are liable to be ‘co-ordinated' out of sight by hasty and inappropriate demands for a common 
plan of attack” (Braybrooke & Lindblom, 1963, p. 105, 106). 
It may be concluded from Lindblom's criticism that the policy model of rational planning and 
control not only is based on the assumption of the rationalist perspective on decision-making, 
but also implies the centralization of the decision-making process and a large amount of 
control both over the actual choice to be made and over the implementation of the chosen 
policy. The model of rational planning and control takes its point of departure in the ideal of 
rational decision-making, but confronted with the limitations of this ideal in actual practice, it 
takes refuge in confidence in centralization and control. 
The model of rational planning and control is an approach to governmental regulation in which 
much confidence is put in the capabilities of governmental actors and agencies to acquire 
comprehensive and true knowledge and to take the best decisions. Also, it is an approach in 
which these governmental actors try to steer an object of regulation by using stringent rules 
and extensive control mechanisms. When government designs and implements operational 
policies using the general policy model of rational planning and control, it sees itself as an 
omniscient and omnipotent actor who thinks itself able to rightfully steer a part of society 
according to its own objectives. 
2.2 The Policy Model of Self-Regulation 
The policy model of self-regulation is basically the opposite of the model of rational planning 
and control. Instead of the assumption that the knowledge of the object of regulation can be 
firm, comes the recognition that such knowledge is highly uncertain. Instead of the wish to 
control the object of regulation as completely as possible, comes the conviction that such a 
control should to a large extent be avoided. Instead of a holistic self-image of the regulating 
subject, comes the assertion that an atomistic self-image offers important advantages. 
The policy model of self-regulation is not so much based on the ideal of rational decision-
making. It rather incorporates the logic and the assumptions of the cybernetic perspective on 
decision-making (Ashby, 1956). I t puts emphasis on the principles of monitoring feedback 
variables. It accepts the idea that a decision-maker should only pay attention to a small set of 
‘critical variables' which he should try to keep within tolerable ranges. And perhaps most 
importantly, it underlines the assumption that the fragmentation of complex decision-making 
processes offers the benefits of a high level of robustness, a high level of flexibility, a high level 
of innovativeness and a low level of information, transaction and administration costs 
(Steinbrunner, 1974). I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 13 
 
From the field of management sciences Beer has indicated that a choice for the cybernetic 
perspective on decision-making is a choice for the strategy of self-regulation.  
“Every manager, whether he runs the family business or a small department in a firm, whether 
he runs the firm itself or a major department of government, whether he runs the country or an 
aspect of international affairs, faces an identical problem. He faces, that is, the need to 
maintain a viable system far more complicated than he personally can understand. And the 
beginning of wisdom for management at any level is the realization that viable systems are, in 
large measure, self-regulating and even self-organising” (Beer, 1975, p. 105, 106).  
Beer makes it clear that the cybernetic perspective on decision-making implies the idea of 
self-regulation. A cybernetic decision-making unit is able to regulate itself. When the feed-back 
loops are working and when a repertory of operations is available, a decision-making unit 
hardly needs regulation from outside. Moreover, a complex system with many interrelated 
decision-making units, is able to realise a high level of stability. Such a system has the 
capacity of ‘homeostasis', i.e. the capacity to hold the critical variables at the level of the 
overall system within acceptable ranges. Confronted with such a system, the task for an 
external (governmental) regulator is only to monitor these critical variables making sure that 
they do not exceed the tolerable ranges, and to evaluate the criteria by which the critical 
variables and the tolerable ranges are chosen. 
In the policy model of self-regulation, the role of an external regulating agency or actor is a role 
at another, higher level: ‘... the role (...) is to remain above the homeostatic fray, and to 
consider what is happening in terms of a higher level understanding' (Beer, 1975, p. 112). Beer 
explains this higher level role with the following illustration from the world of games.  
‘Suppose that as a higher manager you have the responsibility to ensure that team A wins in a 
game which is already being played between team A and team B, where the scoring is already 
even. You could dress yourself in the appropriate regalia and charge onto the field of play. The 
players would recognise you. Your own side might defer to your tactics (...) while the other side 
would do their level best to put you out of action. This is not the way to behave at all (...) the 
clever action would be to change the rules of the game so that your side must win it' (Beer, 
1975, p. 112). 
In the model of self-regulation emphasis is put on the self-regulatory capacities of 
decentralized decision-making units. The complex interrelations between these units are 
respected. The external regulating activities are limited to monitoring the performance of the 
overall system of the interrelated self-regulating decision-making units and to evaluating (and if 
judged necessary, changing) the rules which to a large extent define this performance. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 14 
 
Compared to the model of rational planning and control, the model of self-regulation is far more 
modest. It acknowledges the limitations of acquiring knowledge and exercising control over an 
object of regulation which, in itself, already consists of a complex set of mechanisms of 
decision-making. It tries rather to incorporate the benefits of this complex set of mechanisms 
by limiting itself to setting broad frameworks and by providing facilities for the behaviour of 
decentralized units. 
When government uses the policy model of self-regulation, it sees itself mainly as an arbiter. 
In this model government is the actor who watches the rules of a game played by relatively 
autonomous players and who changes these rules when the game is no longer able to lead to 
satisfactory results. 
3. Policy Models in Higher Education 
Looking at the characteristics of the various higher education systems in the world the two 
general policy models that have just been distinguished can clearly be recognised. Generally 
speaking, from the perspective of governmental policy-making with respect to higher education 
two models can be distinguished that are clearly related to the two general policy models 
presented before. I will call these policy models in higher education: the state control model 
and the state supervising model (Van Vught, 1988; Van Vught, 1992). 
3.1 The State Control Model 
The state control model is traditionally found in the higher education systems of the European 
continent. The so-called ‘continental model'  – to use Clark's label  – (Clark, 1983a), is a 
combination of the authority of state bureaucracy and faculty guilds. 
The higher education systems of the European continent traditionally have been ‘relatively pure 
state systems' (Van de Graaff & Furth, 1978). These systems are created by the state and 
almost completely financed by it. The state very often also is the overarching and highly 
powerful regulator of the system. A clear example is the French higher education system 
which is characterized by a centralized bureaucratic control exercized by the national ministry 
of education. In such systems the state controls, at least formally, nearly all aspects of the 
dynamics of the higher education system. The national ministry of education regulates the 
access conditions, the curriculum, the degree requirements, the examination systems, the 
appointment of academic staff, etc. An important objective of this detailed government 
regulation is the standardization of national degrees, which are often awarded by the state 
rather than by the higher education institutions. In federal systems (like the Federal Republic 
of Germany and the U.S.) state control is usually exercised at the sub-national level. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 15 
 
In the continental model the overwhelming power of the state is combined with a strong 
authority at the level of the senior chaired professors, who hold considerable power at the 
lower level of the system. As has become most visible in the nineteenth century German 
higher education system, the chair holders are able to exercise strong collegial control within 
the faculties and the institutions. 
The result of the combination of authority of state bureaucracy and faculty guilds is a power 
structure which expresses the interests of two groups: state officials and senior professors 
(Clark, 1983a, p. 126). The level of institutional administration is rather weak and in effect often 
bypassed when system-wide decisions are taken (Glenny, 1979). The power distribution of the 
continental model is characterized by a strong top (the state), a weak middle level (the 
institutional administration), and a strong bottom (the senior chair holders) (Clark, 1983a, p. 
127). 
The continental higher education model offers the clearest example of the state control model. 
Especially when the state controls the appointments of the chair holders, it is obvious that the 
state exercises a major influence on the system. In these cases the state often uses the 
higher education system for its professional manpower needs. Both the manpower needs of 
the governmental bureaucracy itself and the assessed needs at the nation's labour market are 
expected to be fulfilled by the higher education system. The state then finds its legitimization 
for the detailed control of the higher education system in the self-proclaimed task to steer the 
nation's economy.  
3.2 The State Supervising Model 
The state supervising model has its roots both in the U.S. higher education system and in the 
traditional British higher education system. The ‘American and British models' – to use again 
Clark's labels – (Clark, 1983a) show far less governmental influence on higher education than 
the continental model. In the British and certainly in the American model the state plays only a 
minor role. Although things have changed rather drastically during the last decade in British 
higher education (see for instance: Walford, 1991), the traditional British model can still serve 
as a conceptual tool to describe a limited state influence. The traditional British model of 
higher education is a combination of the authority of faculty guilds and a modest amount of 
influence of trustees and administrators (vice-chancellors) at the institutional level. In this 
traditional model, British universities are chartered corporations, responsible for their own 
management. Each individual university and college is allowed to decide upon its admission, 
its curricula and the hiring of its faculty. In the traditional British model there is no formally 
organized system of national governmental control. And although during the development of 
British higher education the funding became largely a governmental task, the budget allocation 
remained (until the policy changes of the Thatcher government) in the hands of the senior 
professors (in the University Grants Committee). I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 16 
 
During the last decade, things have changed dramatically in British higher education. The 
higher education budget has been severely cut, a businesslike management style has been 
introduced, an approach of quality monitoring by means of performance indicators has been 
developed and the University Grants Committee has been abolished. British government 
apparently wants to ‘privatize' higher education. A hierarchical businesslike organisational 
structure has been introduced and the influence of industry on higher education has been 
increased (Scott, 1988; Walford, 1991). It could be argued that the traditional British state 
supervising model has recently changed into a ‘non-British' state control model. 
The U.S. higher education model shows a rather limited government  regulation. The U.S. 
model is a combination of the authority of faculty guilds and institutional trusteeship and 
administration. But compared to the traditional British model, the influence of the institutional 
trustees (or regents) and administrators is stronger (Van de Graaff et al., ch. 7). Like the 
British universities, the American institutions are established as chartered corporations. But 
the boards of trustees and the institutional administrators (presidents) play a more important 
role than their British colleagues. The trustees generally appoint the university president who 
to a large extent has the authority over the strategic and financial policies of the institution. In 
the U.S. the professors do not have the power of the chair holders, but the authority of the 
faculty is nevertheless substantial (especially in the academically stronger institutions). 
The influence of government is rather limited. There is hardly any power at the federal level. 
The authority at the state level has been growing during the last few decades (Newman, 1987), 
but this increase of state authority is moving towards ‘adaptations of market control 
mechnisms' like outcomes assessment legislation and performance funding (Dill, 1992, p. 53, 
54). Compared to the level of state influence in the continental model, the U.S. state authority 
in higher education is still rather weak. The U.S. state level regulation largely concerns the 
mechanisms for the organization of quality assessment and the regulation of the right to award 
degrees (Berdahl and Millett, 1991). 
The traditional British and the U.S. models offer examples of what has been called here the 
state supervising model. In this policy model the influence exercized by the state is weak. The 
state sees its task of superving the higher education system in terms of assuring academic 
quality and maintaining a certain level of accountability. Government does not intrude into the 
higher education system by means of detailed regulation and strict control. Rather it respects 
the autonomy of the higher education institutions and it stimulates the self-regulating 
capabilities of these institutions. The state sees itself as a supervisor, steering from a distance 
and using broad terms of regulation.  
It may be clear from the presentation of the two models of state influence on higher education 
(the state control and the state supervising model), that each of these two models is related to 
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The state control model is largely based on the general governmental strategy of rational 
planning and control. The state supervising model is a specialization of the policy model of 
self-regulation. Further on I will explore the effects of each of the two models on the innovative 
behaviour of higher education institutions. But first, let us see what categories of policy-
instruments governments can use in each of the two general policy models (the model of 
rational planning and control and the model of self-regulation). 
4. Policy Instruments 
In principle every government has a number of instruments at its disposal to perform the tasks 
that have been assigned to it. If government wants to ‘produce' certain outcomes, it employs 
certain tools. Without such tools governmental policies would be no more than abstract ideals 
or fantasies. 
In the policy sciences literature the concept of policy-instruments recently has attracted 
renewed interest. Important theoretical concepts have already been developed in the classical 
publications of Dahl and Lindblom (1953) and Etzioni (1968). Dahl and Lindblom distinguished 
four sociopolitical processes which, in their opinion, should be used by ‘any society 
intelligently bent on using its resources efficiently' (Dahl & Lindblom, 1976, p. 172). These four 
processes are: the price system (control of and by leaders), hierarchy (control by leaders), 
polyarchy (control of leaders) and bargaining (control among leaders). Etzioni makes a 
distinction between three types of social relationships: coercive, utilitarian and normative 
relationships. According to Etzioni, in any concrete case there is a mixture of these three 
forms, leading to different kinds of social interaction (Etzioni, 1978). 
Mitnick (1980) takes Dahl and Lindblom's analysis as a starting point to develop a 
categorization of the instruments of government. A crucial distinction in his work is the one 
between ‘regulation by directives' and ‘regulation by incentives'. Regulation by directives is 
defined as ‘the interferences that occur by circumscribing or directing choice in some area – 
i.e. making rules for behaviour that may be transmitted as instruction'. Regulation by 
incentives is described as ‘the interferences that occur by changing the perception of the 
nature of the alternatives for action subject to choice – i.e. changing the relative attractiveness 
of alternatives' (Mitnick, 1980, p. 342, 343). Mitnick develops an overview of ‘some common 
regulatory means' which he classifies in his two broad instrumental categories. Figure 1 
contains this overview. 
Figure 1: Mitnick's categorization of governmental instruments 
Regulation by : 
directive 
public enterprise (extreme case) 
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Regulation by : 
incentive 
 
administrative rules or standards 
tax incentives 
effluent/user charges 
subsidies 
promotion campaign 
laissez faire (extreme case) 
Source: Mitnick, 1980, p. 346. 
It seems that Mitnick's presentation of governmental instruments is based on the criterion of 
the level of restriction by government of the behaviour of societal actors. Directives are more 
restrictive than incentives, and strong incentives are more restrictive than weak incentives. 
Several other authors have pointed at the importance of policy instruments for policy analysis. 
Several studies of policy implementation emphasize the need to further analyse the effects of 
the various categories of instruments (Ingram & Mann, 1980; Mazmanian & Sabatier, 1981). 
Bardach (1979) points to the importance of the behaviourial characteristics of policy-
instruments. Salamon (1981) asks for a re-orientation in the implementation literature toward 
the comparative effectiveness of policy instruments. 
The literature also shows various alternative categorizations of policy instruments. Bardach 
(1979) proposes to distinguish four categories of instruments: prescription, enabling, positive 
incentives and deterrence. Elmore (1987) and McDonnell (1988) indicate that they favor a 
categorization in: mandates (providing constraining rules), inducements (providing financial 
resources to encourage certain activities), capacity (providing financial resources to enable 
actors to take certain actions), and instruments of system change (that alter the arrangement 
of agencies in a policy-network). Schneider and Ingram (1990) distinguish authority tools, 
incentive tools, capacity tools, symbolic and hortatory tools, and learning tools. ‘Authority 
tools' are simply statements backed by the legitimate authority of government that grant 
permissions, prohibit, or require action under designed circumstances'. Incentive tools are 
instruments ‘that rely on tangible payoffs, positive or negative, to induce compliance or 
encourage utilization... Capacity tools provide information, training, education, and resources 
to enable individuals, groups, or agencies to make decisions or carry out activities'. Symbolic 
and hortatory tools  
“seek to change perceptions about policy-preferred behaviour through appeals to intangible 
values... or through the use of images, symbols and labels... Policy tools that promote 
learning provide for wide discretion by lower-level agents or even the target groups themselves, 
who are then able to experiment with different policy approaches. Agents are required to draw 
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that promote interaction among targets and agencies”, (Schneider & Ingram, 1990, p. 514-
522). 
For an overview of policy-instruments I will follow Hood's The Tools of Government (1983). 
Hood distinguishes four categories of governmental instruments. The categories vary 
depending on the ‘basic resources' used by government in trying to reach the objectives set. 
For each category of ‘basic resources' a specific set of instruments can be indicated. For the 
sake of understanding the broad scale of policy-instruments, a slightly modified interpretation 
of Hood's categorization is presented here (see figure 2). I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 20 
 
Figure 2: An overview of the instruments of government 
Instruments of information  responses  
messages 
Instruments of treasure  contracts 
bounties 
transfers 
bearer- directed payments 
Instruments of authority  certificates 
approvals 
conditionals 
enablements 
constraints 
Instruments of action  operational activities 
Source: modified from Hood, 1983 
The first category of instruments concerns the provision of  information. From its specific 
position in society, government has the advantage of being ‘a store of information'. Compared 
with other institutions, governmental agencies often have extra possibilities to develop rather 
broad, panoramic overviews of societal conditions. Hence, government can use the information 
it has at its disposal to try to reach its policy objectives. 
There are various ways government can ‘send out' information. It can provide informed 
responses tailored to questions from outside; it can direct standard messages without being 
asked to specific groups (‘targeting information'); it can send out general messages to the 
broad public. What type of information outlet government uses depends on various factors 
such as the size of the informed population, the degree of attention manifested by the informed 
population, and of course the content of the message. A crucial factor is the political and legal 
framework government operates in. 
In general, it can be said that the providing and propagating of information offers government a 
set of instruments with rather low or even non-existing ‘authority costs'. When information-
oriented instruments can be used, government does not have to lay its authority on the line. It 
can send out the information judged to be necessary or significant, and it can wait and see if 
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A second category of policy instruments concerns ‘the power of treasure'. Treasure is what 
enables government to buy favours, to court popularity, to hire mercenaries, etc.; the power of 
treasure is the power of signing cheques. Hood therefore speaks of the instruments of ‘cheque 
book government'. 
Government can use its treasure in two main ways. It can ‘exchange' it for some good o r 
service. Or it can ‘give it away', that is: it can transfer payments without requiring any ‘quid pro 
quo'. 
According to Hood, the two main instruments of the exchange of treasure are ‘contracts' and 
‘bounties'. Contracts are governmental payments made to specific individuals or organizations, 
under the condition that the recipient supplies a specified product or service. Contracts are 
payments ‘with strings attached'. A governmental contract-payment is only made when the 
recipient of such a payment accepts the conditions which government requires. Like 
contracts, bounties also are payments made in exchange for some ‘quid pro quo', but in the 
case of bounties the individual or organization which is to provide that ‘quid pro quo' is not 
specified. A bounty is awarded to anyone who produces the product or service asked for. 
Bounties are assumed to be especially useful to encourage or discourage specific types of 
societal behaviour. 
The two main governmental instruments of the other method of using the power of treasure (the 
‘give it away' option) are ‘transfers' and ‘bearer-directed payments'. Transfers are exchanges of 
treasure without a requirement of a ‘quid pro quo'; transfers are ‘gifts', made to specific indivi-
duals or organizations for specific purposes or reasons. Bearer-directed payments also do not 
involve a clear ‘quid pro quo'. But, unlike transfers, bearer-directed payments are made to all 
those who, by some token, are eligible for them. 
The instruments of ‘cheque book government' can be used directly by government or indirectly 
through intermediaries. Intermediary organizations are an often used alternative for direct 
governmental allocation of resources, especially when government wants to avoid getting too 
closely involved in highly specialized budget-decisions. 
In general, the instruments of ‘cheque book government' are costly, in the sense that financial 
resources can only be spent once and the renewal of treasure implies the use of the 
mechanism of taxation. On the other hand, as has been argued many times before, treasure is 
an elegant category of instruments, often capable of achieving the kind of societal behaviour 
government sets out to create. 
The third category of policy instruments is formed by the instruments of authority. The 
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Instruments of authority vary depending on the degree of restriction they seek to introduce into 
the behaviour of the targeted subjects. Least constraining in this sense are ‘certificates' and 
‘approvals'. Certificates are authoritative declarations by government about the properties of a 
specific individual or object. Approvals are authoritative declarations in a general sense; 
approvals apply to the world at large or to whomever it may concern. Both certificates and 
approvals are instruments requiring no compulsive action at all from government. 
A subcategory requiring more (but still not extreme) compulsive action is formed by the 
instruments called ‘conditionals' and ‘enablements'. Conditionals are the promises by 
government to act in a certain way when certain conditions arise. A well-known example is the 
governmental guarantee which is provided as a kind of safety-net for certain circumstances. 
Enablements are the tokens which permit certain activities. Modern governments use a large 
variety of enablements. Licences, quotas, warrants, coupons, vouchers and permits are all 
types of enablements. They all allow (but do not compel) the undertaking of certain activities. 
The instrument of authority which asks for compulsive action is the instrument called 
‘constraint'. Constraints, in contrast to certificates, approvals, conditionals and enablements, 
demand or prohibit certain activities. Constraints can be positive (commanding) and negative 
(forbidding). In both cases, they imply a compulsory restriction by government of societal 
behaviour. 
Generally speaking, the instruments of authority depend on the willingness of the public to 
accept them. A low level of respect for and acceptance of government can make these 
instruments rather ineffective. As history has shown, governments sometimes in these cases 
take refuge in the authority-instruments with the highest level of constraint. On the other hand, 
when government is widely respected and accepted, the low-constraint instruments of 
authority may be very effective in producing the outcomes government thinks to be relevant. 
Hood's fourth and final category of policy instruments is the category of (direct) action. Within 
this category fall all kinds of operational activities by government which directly influence the 
citizens, their property, or their environment. Government can use ‘its own' individuals, buil-
dings, equipments and stocks of lands to directly produce certain outcomes or to perform 
certain tasks. It can for instance act as a national banker; it usually operates a system of 
involuntary detention; it sometimes holds a monopoly on the production of a certain good; and 
it of course often takes care of defending  the country, controlling crime, treating sewage, 
controlling traffic, lighting streets, controlling floods, etc. 
The instruments of action to a large extent are related to the traditional monopoly on the use of 
violence and the enforcement of law. As such these instruments tend to be restricted to some 
specific areas of governmental control. Next to these areas the instruments of action are often 
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In general, it should be noted that the governmental instruments of direct action are rather 
expensive. They should be reserved for the governmental monopoly on the use of violence, for 
emergencies and for activities which might otherwise not be performed. 
It may be concluded that, as is the case in several other categorizations, Hood's presentation 
of policy instruments is to a large extent based on the criterium of the level of restraint the 
instruments try to produce with respect to the behaviour of societal actors. 
The instruments of information are hardly at all restrictive. They are used without the explicit 
goal to directly limit the range of behaviourial options of other actors. The objective of the use 
of information instruments is to try to influence the behaviour of others by providing them with 
significant information. 
The instruments of treasure are more restrictive. In particular when government acts as the 
most important funding agent of the activities of other actors, these actors may be strongly 
influenced to adapt their behaviour to the  ideas and wishes of government. ‘Cheque book 
government' in this sense can be very restrictive, although the restraining potential is often 
used in an indirect way. The power of treasure offers governmental agencies the opportunity to 
design and implement financial incentives and disincentives, strongly urging actors to behave 
according to government's wishes. 
The instruments of authority range from mildly restrictive to completely restraining. The 
‘certificates' and ‘approvals' are only mildly restrictive. These specific instruments provide 
governmental agencies with the ability to approve or disapprove. As such they can limit the  
behaviourial options of other actors. Especially when the approval of government is sought after 
(e.g. because such an approval offers the right to acquire financial resources), these mildly 
restrictive instruments may become very effective in influencing the behaviour of non-
governmental actors. The instruments called ‘conditionals' and ‘enablements' have a higher 
level of restrictive potential. They allow or do not allow actors to behave in a certain way, 
usually by providing or denying financial resources or licences. The instruments called ‘con-
straints' are extremely restrictive. These are the instruments a government can use to 
command and forbid and by using them government can compel other actors to behave 
completely according to its wishes. 
The instruments of direct (governmental) action are also, generally speaking, rather restrictive. 
Because these instruments are based either on the governmental monopoly on the use of 
violence, or on the political decision that government should provide a certain collective good, 
these instruments tend to strongly influence the other actors' behaviour. 
However, Hood's presentation seems to imply more than one criterion for the categorization of 
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the particular and the general use of instruments. ‘Particular applications are those that are 
directed at specific and named individuals, organizations or items.... General applications are 
those that are beamed at the world at large and thus apply to whomever it may concern' 
(Hood, 1983, p. 17). Other criteria which seem to be important in Hood's categorization are the 
question whether societal actors should or should not themselves try to obtain the benefits of 
a certain instrument, the question whether societal actors have or have not to provide a ‘quid 
pro quo' and the level of permanence of an instrument (for instance the instruments of authority 
are more durable than the instruments of treasure). 
The presentation of the instruments of government has made it clear that these instruments 
vary according to the level of restraint they try to produce with respect to the behaviour of 
societal actors. This variation in the level of restraint allows us to relate some specific 
categories of instruments to the two general policy models which were distinguished before. 
Generally speaking, it may be expected that the instruments that are highly restrictive are 
more easily applied in the policy model of rational planning and control, while the less 
restrictive instruments are more appropriate in the policy model of self-regulation. 
In the model of rational planning and control a government sees it as its task and its capability 
to influence other societal actors according to its own objectives. In this model government 
judges it to be its prerogative to restrain the behaviourial options of other actors in order to 
reach the goals that are thought to be relevant. In such an approach, highly restrictive 
instruments will be assumed to be the most effective. The highly restraining instruments of 
authority (‘constraints') or the indirect but nevertheless often rather restrictive instruments of 
treasure will be applied to give concrete form to the confidence in centralized control. 
In the policy model of self-regulation government puts its confidence in the self-regulatory 
capacities of decentralized decision-making  units. Governmental activities are limited to 
gathering information so as to be able to watch the overall system of activities and to providing 
and, if judged necessary, changing the broad frameworks that enable and stimulate such a 
system. The instruments which may be expected to be relevant in this policy model are the 
instruments of information (responses and messages) and the mildly restrictive instruments of 
authority (certificates and approvals). A special set of instruments may be formed by the 
indirect instruments of treasure that may be applied at the systems level to install 
mechanisms that may influence actors to change their behaviourial patterns without reducing 
their self-regulatory capacities. 
It should be stressed that policy instruments are seldom used in isolation. The categories of 
instruments which have been presented above can only be distinguished analytically. In reality 
governmental instruments are used in combination and through all kinds of linkages. An 
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directed payment' (a specific instrument of treasure): the licence for a certain activity may 
immediately make a person eligible for a certain transfer of payment without a ‘quid pro quo'. 
Nevertheless, every specific combination of instruments has its own characteristics, which will 
influence its effectiveness and efficiency. Also, every specific combination of instruments may 
lead to different results, depending on the context in which it is used. 
One of the most crucial questions in present-day public sector regulation is how governmental 
policy models and instruments can be matched to the circumstances in which they are 
applied.  In the second part of this article I will address this question by exploring the 
appropriateness of the policy models and policy-instruments that were presented before for 
producing innovations in higher education systems and institutions. 
5. The Study of Innovation 
Innovation is a concept that has attracted much attention in the social sciences. In the 1950s 
and the 1960s there was a strong belief that the construction of a comprehensive theory and 
methodology of innovation would only be a matter of time. There existed a certain optimism 
and enthusiasm about the possibilities and the usefulness of such a theory and methodology. 
The general social theory of innovation would soon enable planners and policy-makers to 
design and implement successful changes and to create a happier society. 
Since then doubt and disappointment have grown. The comprehensive theory and methodology 
did not arise. The growing number of empirical studies offered a picture of extreme variance 
among its findings. The conceptual frameworks remained vague. As Downs and Mohr 
concluded in 1976:  
“... the record in the field of innovation is beyond interpretation. In spite of the large amount of 
energy expended, the results have not been cumulative. This is not to say that the body of 
existing research is useless (...) Perhaps the most straightforward way of accounting for this 
empirical instability and theoretical confusion is to reject the notion that a unitary theory of 
innovation exists” (Downs & Mohr, 1976, p. 701). 
The literature on innovation is very extensive and covers several disciplines. In the field of 
organizational behaviour, research has been undertaken to try to identify some important 
variables which are related to the tendency in organizations to adopt innovations. Variables like 
‘degree of decentralization', ‘degree of formalization', ‘degree of specialization' and ‘complexity' 
are frequently mentioned (Hage & Aiken, 1967). In the field of social-psychology several 
variables are suggested, which are assumed to be related to the development of an innovation 
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compatibility with existing values and practices, and the level of organizational support (Davis 
et al., 1982). 
In literature on higher education the concept of innovation has also received some attention. 
Several rather creative and elegant analyses have been performed from which some interesting 
insights about innovation processes and outcomes in higher education systems can be 
deduced (for instance: Levine, 1980; Cerych & Sabatier, 1986). I will use these studies to 
formulate some insights about the relationships between policy models and policy instruments 
used by governments, and the innovations that take place in higher education systems and 
institutions.  
The conceptual approaches to innovations and innovation processes are numerous. Besides, it 
is not always clear how these various conceptual approaches can be related in order to try to 
gain some increasing understanding of the state of the art in the literature on innovation. 
Dill and Friedman (1979) have tried to identify the major theoretical frameworks in the 
conceptual approaches to innovations and innovation processes, with a special focus on the 
study of higher education. Reviewing these frameworks, they come to the conclusion that the 
theoretical and methodological problems related to the study of innovation processes are still 
quite large. The theoretical frameworks appear to be both too complex and insufficiently 
specified to enable researchers to undertake clear analyses. Measuring the many variables 
mentioned in the frameworks and paying attention to their validity and reliability is an 
enormous task. Dill and Friedman suggest focusing attention on the developments of less 
comprehensive theories. 
In the remainder of this article I will follow this suggestion. I will limit myself to an exploration of 
the relationships between governmental policy models and policy instruments directed towards 
creating and stimulating innovations in higher education systems and institutions, and the 
processes and outcomes of these innovations. To be able to do this, I will now first discuss 
some of the fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions. 
5.1 Fundamental Characteristics of Higher Education Institutions 
Kerr has pointed out that, looked at from without and comparatively, higher education 
institutions (especially research universities) have hardly changed at all during the past 
centuries:  
“About eighty-five institutions in the Western world established by 1520 still exist in 
recognisable forms, with similar functions and with unbroken histories, including the Catholic 
church, the Parliaments of the Isle of Man, of Iceland and of Great Britain, several Swiss 
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monopolies are all gone. These seventy universities, however, are still in the same locations 
with some of the same buildings, with professors and students doing much the same things, 
and with governance carried on in much the same way” (Kerr, 1982, p. 152). 
This striking permanence of higher education institutions has to do with some of the most 
fundamental characteristics of higher education. As in the first medieval universities of 
Bologna, Paris and Oxford, higher education can still be seen as a social system in which the 
handling of knowledge is the most crucial activity. In higher education systems knowledge is 
discovered, conserved, refined, transmitted and applied (Clark, 1983a, p. 12). If there is 
anything fundamental to systems of higher education, it is this handling of knowledge. 
The primacy of the handling of knowledge is related to some other fundamental 
characteristics, which can be found within higher education institutions. 
A primary characteristic concerns the authority of the academic professional experts. In higher 
education institutions many decisions can only be made by these professional experts. These 
are the decisions regarding the detailed knowledge-oriented academic activities of research 
and teaching. In all those specialized knowledge-fields, which are held together in a higher 
education institution, decisions on what and how to investigate, and on what and how to teach 
come, to a large extent, under the direct supervision of the academic experts. Only they are 
able to oversee their specialized fields. Only they are able to stimulate the enthusiasm of 
students for specific objects of study. This is why professional autonomy is so important in 
higher education institutions and this is why these institutions are called ‘professional 
bureaucracies' (Mintzberg, 1979). 
Clark makes it clear how the professionals in higher education organization work with and 
upon knowledge.  
“The factory floor in higher education is cluttered with bundles of knowledge that are attended 
by professionals. The professionals push and pull on their respective bundles. If they are 
doing research, they are trying to increase the size of the bundle and even to reconstitute it. If 
engaged in scholarship other than research, they are conserving, criticising, and reworking it. 
If teaching, they are trying to pass some of it on to the flow-through clientele we call students, 
encouraging them to think about its nature, how it may be used, and perhaps take up a career 
devoted to it. If engaged outside the ‘plant' as advisors, consultants, or lecturers, academics 
further disseminate knowledge to try to draw out its implications for practical use” (Clark, 
1983b, p. 20). 
Of course, not all decisions in higher education institutions are taken by professionals. There 
is a category of purely ‘administrative' decisions (for example, regarding financial 
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influence. There is also a category of decisions which are mainly taken by ‘clients' (students, 
research contractors). And there is an important category of decisions mainly taken by 
‘outsiders' (government, funding agencies, evaluating committees). Nevertheless, the influence 
of the professional experts on the decision-making processes in higher education institutions 
is extensive. In many decisions taken at these institutions professionals play an important 
role. 
A second important characteristic is the organizational principle that in higher education 
institutions the knowledge areas form the basic foci of attention. The knowledge areas are the 
‘building blocks' of a higher education organization and without some institutionalization of 
these knowledge areas a higher education organization cannot exist. This principle leads to 
the typical organizational structure of higher education institutions. Fragmentation is abundant 
in these organizations. Throughout the organization specialized cells exist which are only 
loosely coupled. Higher education institutions are ‘loosely coupled systems' (Weick, 1976). 
The crucial knowledge oriented activities take place within the rather autonomous cells. 
Specialists in specific knowledge fields group together to teach and undertake research. To a 
large extent insulated from the rest of the organization, these specialists use their autonomy 
and expertise to perform the basic activities of the higher education institution.  
“... specialized professionals have little need to relate to one another within the local shop (...) 
They can produce on their own (...) Producing separately for the most part, the many groups 
become an extreme case of loosely-linked production. The university is a gathering place for 
professionalized crafts, evermore a confederation, a conglomerate, of knowledge-bearing 
groups that require little operational linkage” (Clark, 1983b, p. 21). 
According to Clark it is this organizational fragmentation that explains the miraculous 
adaptability of higher education institutions. This adaptability consists of ‘the capacity to add 
and subtract fields of knowledge and related units without disturbing all the others'. Clark 
argues that ‘it is the peculiar internal constitution of universities that allow them (...) to bend 
and adapt themselves to a whole variety of circumstances and environments, thus producing 
diversity among universities (...) and, at the same time, to maintain an appearance of similarity 
that allows us to recognise them in all the guises which they take' (Clark, 1983a, p. 186, 187). 
A further fundamental characteristic of higher education institutions is the extreme diffusion of 
the decision making power. In an organization where the production processes are knowledge-
intensive, there is a need to decentralise. When besides that, such an organization is also 
heavily fragmented, the decision-making power will be spread over a large number of units and 
actors. A higher education institution therefore becomes a federal system; ‘semi-autonomous 
departments and schools, chairs and faculties act like small sovereign states as they pursue 
distinctive self-interests and stand over against the authority of the whole' (Clark, 1983a, p. 
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A final characteristic, which is typical for higher education institutions based on the continental 
or the traditional British model, is the way authority is distributed within these institutions. 
Traditionally in these models, this authority has been (and in many occasions still is) located 
at the lower levels of the organization, that is: with the academic professionals (see before). At 
the level of the institutional administration authority is rather weak. Institutional administrators 
only have a very limited capacity to steer ‘their' organization. 
Reviewing the fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions just mentioned, it 
may be concluded that the context of higher education confronts government with some speci-
fic problems when it wants to develop and implement a policy directed towards influencing 
higher education institutions. The extreme professional autonomy within these institutions and 
the rather limited administrative authority, as well as the organizational fragmentation and the 
diffusion of the decision-making power make it very difficult to completely control these institu-
tions from an external position. Higher education institutions appear to be very complex 
associations of largely autonomous cells. Besides, in higher education institutions the 
traditional guild-culture, rooted in the Middle Ages, is still very much alive. Higher education 
institutions cherish the traditional norms and values of the ‘republic of science' (Polanyi, 1962), 
which enable them to perform their highly professional tasks. 
The fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions suggest that these institutions 
can only be controlled from outside when the organizational variety is greatly reduced and 
when the professional autonomy is largely restrained. However, it should be realized that when 
such an external control is imposed, the professional tasks these institutions perform may be 
severely damaged. Confronted with detailed regulation and with an extreme restriction of their 
behaviour, the scientists and teachers within the higher education institutions may feel the dis-
illusionment of not being able to explore the paths their professional consciousness stimulates 
them to go. They may become uninterested in new developments, get bored by the routine 
activities they have to perform and lose their interest in innovations. 
5.2 Innovations in Higher Education 
Having explored the processes of innovation in general and more specifically in the context of 
higher education, I will now try to develop some theoretical insights about the relationships 
between governmental policy models and policy instruments (directed towards the creation of 
innovations) on the one hand, and innovation processes in higher education systems and 
institutions on the other hand. 
To present the theoretical insights I will classify the rather extensive literature on innovation 
processes in two broad categories. These categories can be described as ‘the organizational 
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successful innovations'. I will discuss the present state of the art in the higher education 
literature regarding both these categories. 
5.3 Organizational Variables Related to Success of Innovations 
In their impressive research-overview of the principal organizational variables that have 
appeared to influence the success or failure of innovation processes in organizations, Hage 
and Aiken (1970) offer seven factors which are related to the rate of change in an organization. 
These factors can be described as follows: 
–  the greater the formalization (i.e. the greater the degree of codification of jobs, the 
greater the number of rules specifying what is to be done, and the more strictly these 
rules are enforced), the lower the rate of organizational change; 
–  the higher the centralization (i.e. the smaller the proportion of jobs and occupations that 
participate in decision-making and the fewer the decision-making areas in which they are 
involved), the lower the rate of organizational change; 
–  the greater the stratification (i.e. the greater the disparity in rewards such as salaries 
and prestige between the top and bottom ranks of an organization), the lower the rate of 
organizational change; 
–  the greater the complexity (i.e. the greater the number of occupations/specialties of an 
organization and the greater the degree of professionalism of each), the greater the rate 
of organizational change; 
–  the higher the volume of production (i.e. emphasis on quantity versus quality in 
organizational outputs), the lower the rate of organizational change; 
–  the greater the emphasis on efficiency (i.e. concern with cost or resource reduction), the 
lower the rate of organizational change; 
–  the higher the job satisfaction, the greater the rate of organizational change. 
Hage and Aiken's factors are discussed by Levine (1980) in the context of innovations in higher 
education. Levine suggests that higher education organizations are low in formalization, low in 
centralization, low in stratification, high in complexity, high in the emphasis on quality of 
outputs, low on efficiency and high on job satisfaction. The author therefore comes to the 
conclusion that ‘institutions of higher education might be classified as low in innovation 
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The discussion of the fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions (see before) 
seems on the one hand to lead to the same conclusion. The high autonomy of the 
professionals within these organizations, the organizational fragmentation, the diffusion of the 
decision-making power and the limited administrative authority indicate that higher education 
organizations are  not very formalised, centralized, stratified and directed towards efficiency, 
but are very complex and by their specific nature offer the possibilities for a strong emphasis 
on quality of production and a high level of job satisfaction. 
However, as has been indicated by Kerr and many others, it should also be remembered that 
higher education institutions by nature are conservative and that in these organizations 
innovations are not likely to occur. According to Hefferlin (1969) for instance, innovations will 
occur in higher education institutions only when the level of instability in these institutions is 
high, i.e., when conditions arise like changing faculties because of expansion or turnover, low 
rates of tenure, rotating department chairpersons, etc. 
It seems that we are confronted with two contradicting theoretical observations. Let us look at 
this subject from another perspective. 
Clark (1983a) has argued that change is far more crucial in higher education institutions than 
conventional wisdom would suggest.  
“Despite the belief of many observers that academic systems change significantly only when 
pressured by external forces, such systems increasingly exhibit innovation and adaptation 
among their bottom lines. Invention and diffusion are institutionalized in the work of the 
departments and counterpart units that embody the disciplines and professions (...) Such 
change is widely overlooked... It occurs in segments of the operating level (...) In a bottom-
heavy knowledge institution, grassroots innovation is a crucial form of change” (Clark, 1983a, 
p. 234, 235). 
Clark points once more at the characteristics of higher education institutions. Innovations take 
place through the professional activities in the various semi-autonomous units in the 
organization. 
Kerr (1982) seems to agree with this point of view. According to him a distinction should be 
made between a perspective from within and a perspective from without. ‘Looked at from 
within, universities have changed enormously in the emphases on their several functions and in 
their guiding spirits, but looked at from without and comparatively, they are among the least 
changed of institutions' (Kerr, 1982, p. 152, 153). 
Bok (1986) makes clear how the two theoretical observations which seem to be contradictory, 
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characteristics, higher education institutions in principle are low in innovation resistance. 
However, he also points out that these very factors make it difficult to keep innovations alive. 
“Universities are large, decentralized, informal organizations with little hierarchical authority 
over teaching and research. These characteristics favour innovation by making it easy for any 
of a large number of faculty members to experiment in search of better ways of educating 
students. Unfortunately, the very factors that aid experimentation make it harder for 
successful initiatives to spread throughout the institution or from one institution to another” 
(Bok, 1986, p. 176). 
Innovations are created easily within higher education organizations and (as Clark indicates) 
they may even spread among their bottom levels. But this diffusion of innovation only takes 
place by virtue of the professional belief that certain innovations are worthwhile. Faculty 
members will only adopt innovations when they judge them to be worthwhile for their own acti-
vities. As Bok observes ‘... the most promising innovations can languish unless some effective 
force causes them to be emulated widely' (Bok, 1986, p. 176). And the most effective force is 
probably the conviction of professional colleagues that an innovation is an effective solution to 
a common problem. 
This point of view leads to an important conclusion: innovations in higher education institutions 
may arise easily and often, but their diffusion will be difficult and will mainly take place through 
communication between colleagues. 
Clark points at another aspect of the processes of change within higher education institutions. 
He indicates that innovations in higher education institutions are mainly incremental 
adjustments, building up to larger flows of change. Major, sudden and comprehensive changes 
are rare in higher education institutions. Exactly because of the fragmentation of tasks and the 
diffusion of power such changes are extremely difficult to effect. 
It should be realised that the ideology of the academic profession incorporates a basic 
resistance to comprehensive changes, especially when these are launched ‘from above'. The 
organizational fragmentation and the diffusion of the decision-making power demand that a 
relatively large number of people and groups with a wide variation in values and opinions tend 
to discuss a launched comprehensive reform, the result of which will often be that the reform 
strands in debates and political fights. Becher and Kogan (1980) argue that, because of the 
fundamental characteristics of higher education systems, innovation processes are localised 
and specific. 
‘... we are not dealing with a hierarchical system, where change can be decreed from above, 
but rather with a negotiative one, in which individuals, basic units and institutions each regard 
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proposal has to be finally sanctioned by those who are in a position to put it into effect” 
(Becher & Kogan, 1980, p. 121). 
This argument has brought many authors to the conclusion that, generally speaking, govern-
ment-initiated reforms in higher education systems must fail. Referring to the study of Cerych 
and Sabatier (1986) (see below), Kerr (1987), for instance, comes to the conclusion that 
‘intentional changes' have sometimes perhaps been partially successful, but most often have 
been a failure. Curricular reforms and changes of governance, generally speaking cannot be 
called a success (Kerr, 1987, p. 185). 
A possible explanation for this observation can again be found in the fundamental 
characteristics of higher education institutions. Kerr (1982) stresses that most decisions 
concerning the dynamics of a higher education system are taken outside the formal system of 
governance.  
“Most decisions about teaching, about curriculum, about research topics and methods, about 
amount and form of public service are made by individual faculty members. Most decisions 
made about majors selected, courses taken and time spent on study are made by individual 
students” (Kerr, 1982, p. 178). 
Besides, Kerr indicates that, when intense competition exists among higher education 
institutions (as in the U.S.), specific arrangements of governance have only minor implications. 
Also Bok points out that educational reforms in higher education institutions are seldom the 
result of external influences (including governmental policies). According to him, external 
pressures can only be successful when they link up with initiatives or opinions inside a higher 
education institution. 
“... no external influence offers a reliable way of initiating constructive change or eliciting new 
ideas to improve the quality of education. The vital task ultimately rests within the university 
itself” (Bok, 1986, p. 183). 
Becher and Kogan (1980) have presented an elegant analysis of innovation processes in 
higher education systems by differentiating between four levels of these systems: the system 
as a whole, the institution, the basic unit (within the institution) and the individual. According to 
these authors innovative attempts often fail because they are unable to accommodate to 
existing structural constraints.  
“Academic structures and regulations for the most part evolve to protect the legitimate 
interests of researchers and teachers. They help to define, and also defend, the main areas of 
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intractable. Even when an innovative idea is generally accepted on intellectual grounds, it may 
face severe difficulty if it appears to conflict with conventional practice, or to cut across some 
existing organizational arrangement” (Becher & Kogan, 1980, p. 146, 147). 
Becher and Kogan therefore also put a heavy emphasis on the specific organizational 
characteristics of higher education institutions as important barriers to innovation. They argue 
that the often mentioned conservatism of higher education institutions ‘mainly stems from con-
textual, rather than from personal factors' (Becher & Kogan, 1980, p. 147). 
Others have tried to take up the challenge of the ‘policy failure theme' in higher education. 
Referring to his analysis of the Swedish higher education policy which led to the reforms of 
1975-1977, Lane (1985) has argued that policy-driven changes in a higher education system 
are possible. But, like the authors just mentioned, he also points out that, to be able to be 
successful, reform policies should pay attention to the basic characteristics of higher 
education institutions. ‘Indeed organizational transformation of higher education work and 
higher education institutions is feasible, as long as basic features of the differentiation of work 
and the structure of authority inherent in the conduct of higher education activities are not 
threatened. Whereas public policy may effect institution-building and redefinition, it cannot do 
away with the bottom-dominated nature of the organization of higher education life' (Lane, 
1984, p. 107). 
Premfors (1984) disputes Lane's ‘optimism', but he does not conclude that the Swedish higher 
education reform policy was a complete failure.  
“...Swedish higher education policy is a mixed bag of success and failure when judged in 
terms of the initial intentions of central policy-makers (...) To an important extent (...) these 
outcomes have been predicated on basic features of higher education organization in Sweden” 
(Premfors, 1984, p. 47, 48). 
The same kind of conclusion (in a broader perspective) is drawn by Cerych and Sabatier 
(1986), who studied a number of policy-driven reforms in higher education systems in Europe. 
Cerych and Sabatier examined the levels of success and failure of nine rather comprehensive 
reforms which were all largely initiated and developed by government and implemented in a 
higher education system through the interaction between governmental organizations and 
higher education institutions. In their comparative analysis Cerych and Sabatier present a 
general picture from which it can be concluded that both successes and failures can be 
distinguished. 
This differentiated picture appears to underline Premfors' conclusion about the Swedish higher 
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‘mixed bags of success and failure'. An important question of course concerns the factors that 
might influence the levels of success and failure of these Reforms. 
5.4 Characteristics of Successful Innovations 
In a study which has become widely known in the field, Rogers and Shoemaker (1971) have 
analyzed more than 1500 studies regarding the characteristics that determine an innovation's 
success or failure. The authors present five critical characteristics: 
–  the compatibility of a new idea (i.e., the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
consistent with the existing values, past experience and needs of the receiver) is 
positively related to its rate of adoption; 
–  the relative advantage of a new idea (i.e., the degree to which an innovation is perceived 
as being better than the idea it supersedes) is positively related to its rate of adoption; 
–  the complexity of an innovation (i.e., the degree to which an innovation is perceived as 
relatively difficult to understand and use) is not related to its rate of adoption; 
–  the triability of an innovation (i.e., the degree to which an innovation may be 
experimented with on a limited basis) is positively related to its rate of adoption; 
–  the observability of an innovation (i.e., the degree to which the results of an innovation 
are visible to others) is positively related to its rate of adoption (Rogers & Shoemaker, 
1971, p. 350-352). 
In Levine's analysis (1980) (see before) some important observations can be found concerning 
the importance of these general characteristics in the context of higher education. This study 
especially focused on the ‘institutionalization or termination stage' of innovation processes. 
This stage is supposed to follow the stages of ‘recognition of the need for change', ‘planning an 
innovation' and ‘implementing the innovation'. In the institutionalization or termination stage 
attention is concentrated on ‘the ways in which innovations prosper, persist, decline and fail 
after they have been adopted' (Levine, 1980, p. 10). 
Levine has developed a theoretical model of the ways innovations can be handled in an 
organization. He suggests that in principle two mechanisms can be used. The first mechanism 
is called  boundary expansion: ‘... an acceptance by the host [organization] of some or all of 
the innovation's differences'. This mechanism essentially indicates a process of acceptance 
(which may be more or less comprehensive). Levine indicates that this acceptance can involve 
diffusing the innovation through the organization or establishing it as an enclave. ‘Diffusion is 
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organization, and enclaving is the process whereby the innovation assumes an isolated 
position within the organization'. 
The other mechanism of handling an innovation in an organization is called  boundary 
contraction: ‘... a constriction of organizational boundaries in such a manner as to exclude 
innovation differences'. This mechanism labels an innovation as illegitimate or deviant. Again, 
two forms can be distinguished. ‘Resocialization occurs when the innovative unit is made to 
renounce its past deviance and institute the acceptable norms, values and goals (...) 
Termination occurs when the innovation is eliminated' (Levine, 1980, p. 14, 15). 
Which of the four possible outcomes of the institutionalization / termination stage of innovation 
processes (diffusion, enclaving, resocialization, termination) will occur depends, in Levine's 
theoretical model, on two variables: compatibility and profitability. Like Rogers and Shoemaker, 
Levine sees compatibility as the degree to which the norms, values and goals of an innovation 
are congruent with those of the organization which has to adopt the innovation. Profitability is a 
subjective concept, rather similar to Rogers and Shoemaker's ‘relative advantage'. It indicates 
the degree to which an innovation satisfies the adopter's needs or satisfies him better than the 
existing mechanisms. 
Levine's conclusions are that compatibility and profitability are both crucial variables for 
explaining the success or failure of the adoption of an innovation. An innovation appears to fail 
(i.e. is resocialised or terminated) when the levels of compatibility and profitability of the 
innovation decline. Profitability is an especially important variable. When the profitability of an 
innovation is not disputed, an innovation can still get accepted, even when the compatibility of 
such an innovation is low. However, when the profitability is seriously questioned, an innovation 
will fail, even when the compatibility is high. 
The argument that the compatibility of an innovative idea is positively related to the rate of 
adoption of an innovation is frequently found in the literature. We already noticed that for 
instance Bok (1986) stresses this point. Becher and Kogan (1980) argue that structural 
reforms of a system as a whole can only succeed when they relate to the fundamental values 
in higher education (Becher & Kogan, 1980, p. 125). 
Concerning the relationship between compatibility and rate of the adoption of  an innovation 
Cerych and Sabatier (1986) introduce an interesting amendment. Cerych and Sabatier propose 
a three-dimensional framework for the conceptualization of the ‘scope of change'.  
“Depth of change indicates the degree to which a new policy goal implies a departure from 
existing values and practices of higher education (...) Functional breadth of change refers to 
the number of functional areas in which a given policy is expected to introduce more or less 
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so forth (...)  Level of change indicates the target of the reform: the system as a whole; a 
particular sector or segment of the system (group of institutions); a single institution or an 
institutional sub-unit”. 
Reviewing the various comprehensive reforms that were the object of their analysis, Cerych 
and Sabatier draw several conclusions. Regarding the interconnection between depth of 
change and functional breadth of change they claim that reforms that  postulate a radical 
departure of existing rules and values, can nevertheless be successfully implemented when 
they are limited to a few functional areas (of the higher education institution or of the higher 
education system as a whole) and if at the same time most other prevailing traditions and 
standards are rigorously accepted. With respect to the level of change, the authors conclude 
that, generally speaking, a reform succeeds more easily if it affects an institutional or sub-
institutional process, rather than a system as a whole (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986, p. 244-247). 
It appears that Cerych and Sabatier, although they agree with the general conclusion of 
Rogers and Shoemaker that the more a reform is consistent with existing values the more 
likely it will be implemented, also notice that a low level of compatibility does not necessarily 
mean that an innovation cannot be successfully implemented. An important question then is 
what other factors may stimulate or hamper innovations. 
We already noticed that Levine has suggested that the concept of profitability is of crucial 
importance for the explanation of the acceptance of innovations in higher education 
institutions. The concept of profitability is also often mentioned in the literature as an important 
variable positively related to the rate of adoption of an innovation. Becher and Kogan underline 
their view that externally initiated innovations can be successful in higher education, provided 
that they are acceptable in terms of intellectual substance ( compatibility) and that they 
establish their merits (for instance in terms of student recruitment) (profitability) (Becher & 
Kogan, 1980, p. 132). With regard to the analysis of the outcomes of innovation processes, 
Clark uses the metaphor of a seesaw, ‘a long board on which reform-supporting and reform-
opposing groups sit at different points in relation to the centre of balance'. According to this 
author, a decision, whether an innovation will or will not be accepted is the result of the 
distribution of p ower among the groups involved in the decision-making process. And the 
behaviour of each group and individual in the decision-making process is guided by the 
subjective interpretation of self-interest.  
“Innovations typically "fail" because the innovators cannot acquire enough power fully to 
protect their new ways. They are allowed to start, even to acquire a clientele, but unless they 
attach the interests of various groups to their own interests and persuade potential opponents 
at least to be moderate in  their resistance, they can be tightly bounded  – resocialised or 
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respect to the reform, and increase the bearing of their own weight” (Clark, 1983a, p. 226, 
227). 
Clearly, like Levine, both Becher and Kogan and Clark combine the concepts of compatibility 
and profitability. In both their analytical interpretations of the potential success of an innovation 
the two concepts are interrelated. 
The concepts of compatibility and profitability offer us the possibility of formulating some 
further insights about the appropriateness of governmental policy models with respect to higher 
education. If we follow the conclusions of the studies just discussed and if we take into 
account that the higher education context is characterized by a large professional autonomy, a 
large organizational fragmentation, a diffusion of the decision-making power and a limited 
administrative authority, we may expect that governmental reform policies which pay attention 
to compatibility and profitability will be more effective in creating innovations than policies in 
which these concepts are not taken into account. 
The discussion of innovation characteristics that are supposed to determine the success or 
failure of an innovation has so far concentrated on two of the five characteristics presented in 
the survey of Rogers and Shoemaker: compatibility and profitability (relative advantage). 
However the authors mentioned three other factors: complexity, triability and observability. 
Concerning the complexity of innovation Rogers and Shoemaker themselves suggest that no 
relationship exists with the rate of adoption. According to them the degree to which an 
innovation is perceived to be difficult to understand or use, does not really influence the 
process of acceptance or refusal of an innovation. 
However, in the field of higher education another conclusion appears to be drawn. Cerych and 
Sabatier argue that a reform that is both ‘deep and broad' will tend to fail (Cerych & Sabatier, 
1986, p. 145). When complexity is defined as the combination of the degree to which an 
innovation is a departure from existing values and practices with the number of functional areas 
aimed at by innovation, the level of complexity of an innovation process in higher education 
may be expected to be negatively related to the rate of adoption of the innovation. The more 
complex an innovation, the less successful that innovation will be in getting adopted. 
The observability of an innovation is another factor presented by Rogers and Shoemaker as 
having a positive relationship with the rate of adoption: the more the goals and results of the 
innovation are visible and clear, the more likely it is that the innovation will be accepted. 
In the field of higher education research Becher and Kogan (1980) come to the conclusion that 
the observability of an innovation is indeed of some influence. Taking the same position as I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 39 
 
Cerych and Sabatier (1986) with respect to depth and breadth of innovations (see before), they 
argue that  
“innovations which manage (...) to challenge certain accepted ideas while reinforcing others 
have a fair chance of success, provided that they also meet two other prerequisites: that their 
merits are reasonably visible and that they do not appear seriously to undermine the existing 
patterns of freedom and control” (Becher & Kogan, 1980, p. 146).  
Becher and Kogan's second prerequisite can be translated in terms of profitability. It may be 
interpreted as the inclination to guard the self-perceived interests of academic groups, often 
expressed as the conservation of the academic definitions of legitimate activities. The first 
prerequisite has to do with observability: to be able to be successful the merits of innovations 
have to be visible. 
Cerych and Sabatier also suggest that in theory a high level of clarity and consistency of the 
objectives of an innovation facilitates the implementation of innovations. However, from their 
case studies they also conclude that in practice vagueness and ambiguity of objectives appear 
to prevail, especially because otherwise a consensus on the proposed innovation would not 
have occurred (Cerych & Sabatier, 1986, p. 13, 14, 243). 
Taking the arguments by Becher and Kogan and by Cerych and Sabatier into account, it can 
be argued that observability as such can hardly be called an important factor for the success 
or failure of an innovation. At most the level of observability of the objectives and expected 
results of an innovation is a strategic element in presenting an innovation as compatible with 
existing values or as profitable for certain groups and interests. Following Levine (1980) it could 
concluded that, when the objective is to guarantee that others have an accurate or positive 
picture of an innovation, this factor has more to do with compatibility and profitability than with 
observability per se. Guaranteeing an accurate or positive picture implies preventing the 
innovation from appearing incompatible and/or unprofitable (Levine, 1980, p. 187). 
This leaves us with triability as a last innovation characteristic which is supposed to be 
positively related to the rate of adoption. Triability concerns an organization's ability to try an 
innovation within a limited period and on a limited scale. Moreover, it has to do with the 
condition that if, after trying an innovation, the conclusion is that the results are disappointing, 
the situation is reversible without severe damage. 
Cerych and Sabatier have found that the assumptions on which reforms are based often are 
erroneous. This should not surprise us. As is the case with every process of policy-design, so 
too the process of the design of innovations in higher education has to face the basic human 
impotence in accurately foretelling the future. Our knowledge can only be incomplete and 
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Triability is a prudent strategy for those who do not want to overrate the level of knowledge 
incorporated in the assumptions which form the basis of a certain reform policy or innovation. 
This is especially the case in higher education because it may be expected that scientists 
and scholars are particularly sceptical about these kinds of assumptions. It is because of this 
that Bok (1986) pleads for implementing innovations in higher education institutions by means 
of experiments. Referring to an example of the Harvard Medical School he argues:  
“This tactic has obvious advantages. It relies entirely on volunteers and hence makes few, if 
any demands on unwilling faculty members. It costs less than an institution-wide reform. It 
minimises the risks of failure by leaving traditional programs intact. These virtues are often 
decisive in holding open the chance of making a substantial change” (Bok, 1986, p. 187, 
188).  
The major problem with the experimental strategy is of course the spreading of a successful 
experiment through the entire institution. As was noticed before, the diffusion of an innovation 
will only take place by virtue of the professional belief that an innovation is worthwhile. Regard-
ing this issue the concepts of compatibility and profitability have provided us with some 
insights. Nevertheless, a strategy of experimenting with innovations must be judged to be 
especially suited to higher education. Therefore, governmental policies that pay attention to 
triability may be expected to be more successful in creating innovations in higher education 
institutions than policies in which the idea of triability is absent. 
Reviewing the points of view and analyzes of the various authors mentioned above an important 
conclusion should be that government-initiated innovations in higher education institutions and 
systems can be successful only when certain conditions are met. These conditions have to do 
with the specific characteristics of higher education institutions. Innovations in higher 
education institutions can only be brought about by governmental policies, when attention is 
paid in these policies to the basic values and mechanisms of academic life. 
It also can be concluded that an innovative policy can be expected to be more successful 
when in such a strategy attention is paid to the compatibility and the profitability of the 
innovation. The compatibility of an innovation (i.e. the degree to which the innovation is 
perceived to be consistent with existent values and practices) is, generally speaking, positively 
related to the rate of adoption of the innovation. However, a reform that implies a radical 
departure from existing values and practices can nevertheless be successful when the 
‘functional breadth of change' is limited, that is, when the reform is limited to a few functional 
areas while at the same time some other prevailing values and practices are rigorously 
accepted. 
The profitability of an innovation is also positively related to the rate of adoption of the 
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supersedes) should be clear to those who are supposed to accept it. The behaviour of each 
group and individual confronted with an innovation, is guided by the subjective interpretation of 
self-interest. The outcome of an innovation process to a large extent depends on the 
distribution of power among the self-interested actors involved in the decision-making process 
regarding the innovation. 
The complexity of an innovation was found to be negatively related to the rate of adoption of 
the innovation. When complexity is defined as the combination of the degree to which an 
innovation is a departure from existing values and practices with the number of functional areas 
aimed at by the innovation, it may be concluded that the higher the level of complexity of an 
innovation, the less likely it is that the innovation will be accepted. 
With respect to the observability of an innovation (i.e. the degree to which the objectives and 
expected results are clear) it was argued that this factor should be interpreted as a strategic 
element in presenting an innovation in terms of compatibility or profitability. 
The triability of an innovation (i.e. the degree to which an innovation may be experimented with) 
was judged to be of great importance in higher education. Experimenting with innovations is a 
prudent strategy, especially because the professionals in higher education institutions will be 
particularly sceptical about the policy-assumption on which these innovations are based. 
6. Conclusion 
In the beginning of this article it was argued that the policy model of rational planning and 
control on the one hand and the policy model of self-regulation on the other vary in a rather 
fundamental way with regards to the assumptions they are based on. The model of rational 
planning and control is founded on the basic assumption of the rationalist perspective on 
decision-making. In every practical decision-making situation it strives after the objective of 
trying to select the best alternative from a set that should be as complete as possible. But 
confronted with the limitations of this ideal, in practice the strategy of rational planning and 
control takes its refuge in confidence in a strong centralization of decision-making processes 
and a large amount of control over these decision-making processes as well as over the imple-
mentation of the chosen policy. 
The policy model of self-regulation is based on the cybernetic perspective on decision-making. 
It tries to make use of the self-regulatory capacities of decentralized decision-making units. It 
limits the role of government to the monitoring of a set of ‘critical variables' and to the analysis 
and, if judged necessary, the influencing of the framework of rules guiding the behaviour of 
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With respect to governmental policies in the field of higher education two models were 
introduced: the state control and the state supervising model. The state control model is 
largely based on the policy model of rational planning and control. The state supervising model 
reflects the policy model of self-regulation. 
In the first part of this section also an overview was presented of the various policy-instruments 
governments may use when they set themselves the task to influence activities and processes 
in the public sector. 
The questions which I will try to answer in this concluding paragraph are: which of the two 
higher education policy models (state control and state supervision) is best suited to stimulate 
innovations in higher education systems and institutions? And: what policy-instruments may 
be expected to be successful in that context? 
It may be hypothesised from the analysis presented above that, when the basic objective is to 
stimulate the innovativeness of the higher education institutions, the model of state control, 
generally speaking, is less successful than the model of state supervision. The model of state 
control appears to be based on assumptions that are at odds with some of the fundamental 
characteristics of higher education institutions. The model of state control ignores the 
fundamental features of higher education institutions that are found in characteristics like the 
high level of professional autonomy, the large organizational fragmentation and the large diffu-
sion of the decision-making power. 
The state supervising model appears to be better suited to the context of higher education. It 
acknowledges the fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions and it tries to 
make use of some of these characteristics to stimulate the innovativeness of the whole 
system of higher education. By limiting itself to only global forms of steering and by putting its 
confidence in the self-regulatory capacities of the professionals and the basic units of the 
higher education institutions, this model has the potential to become an effective paradigm for 
successful operational policies with respect to higher education in many countries (Neave & 
Van Vught, 1991). 
Along the same lines it may be expected that a combination of mildly restrictive policy-
instruments will be more successful in stimulating innovations in  higher education than a 
combination of extreme compulsive instruments. Compulsive instruments will restrict over the 
behaviour of the professional scholars in higher education institutions and, by doing so, create 
disillusion and apathy, rather than enthusiasm and innovativeness. It may be assumed that the 
fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions add up to a context in which 
government cannot execute compulsive actions without also bringing about some negative 
side-effects of these actions. Using Hood's categorization of policy-instruments, it may be 
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restrictive instruments of authority (certificates and approvals) and the ‘give it away' 
instruments of treasure (transfer and bearer-directed payments) may be expected to be the 
most effective in the context of higher education. 
With respect to higher education Clark (1983b) especially has asked the question of 
‘governance fit':  
“What governance arrangements are ‘naturally’ generated? What structures of governance help 
this or that function to operate well? What governance ‘fits’?” (Clark, 1983b, p. 27).  
Clark comes to the conclusion that  
“fit is a matter of balance among alternative forms for effecting national governance. Too 
much emphasis in any one direction, for example on state command, produces an imbalance 
that leads to a ‘fit’ in a different meaning of the term! – a sudden and violent attack of a 
disorder, a convulsion, an exacerbation of troubles perhaps leading to prolonged sickness” 
(Clark, 1983b, 27). 
In this article an issue has been explored which is very much related to Clark's question of 
governance fit. My conclusion was that the state supervising model appears to fit better than 
the state control model and that mildly restrictive instruments fit better than compulsive 
instruments. 
Clark argues that differentiation should be the name of the governance game in higher 
education. He indicates (among other things) that diverse structures accommodate the 
conflicting tasks of higher education better than simple structures, that diverse structures 
allow status differentiation and sector diversification and that diverse structures stimulate 
flexibility and innovation (Clark, 1983b, p. 31-37). Along the same lines I have tried to show 
that the state supervising model (because of its foundation in the cybernetic perspective on 
decision-making) offers the advantages of flexibility and innovation, of experimenting and 
robustness, of self-determination and responsibility. At the same time this model is relatively 
low in the costs of information, transaction and administration. 
The problems with which the model of state control is confronted in higher education can to a 
large extent be carried back to the basic differences between this model and the fundamental 
characteristics of the higher education context. The adherents of the state control model tend 
to see higher education more as an object than as a complex set of subjects (Trow, 1980; 
Neave, 1985). Besides, they see a higher education system as an object which can be 
controlled from outside and which can be moulded to the wishes of government. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 44 
 
The state control model puts its confidence in centralization and a large amount of control. But 
by doing so, it alienates itself from a societal sector like higher education, which above all else 
is characterized by a large amount of autonomy and differentiation. Speaking of the ‘unitary 
approach' Clark (1983b) formulates the same conclusion:  
“Surely what we fear most about the unitary approach is the way it cramps a multiplicity of 
approaches and increases the likelihood of the arbitrary dictate and the large error. Nearly 
every time we plan centrally we eliminate some options of the operators. In each reform we 
add structures that constrain future choices. If we do not want things to escape our eyes, we 
systemise some more, generating a rule book that clogs formal channels and in turn stimu-
lates underground activity for getting things done” (Clark, 1983b, p. 38). 
It should not be surprising that the model of state control cannot be called a good fit for an 
innovation-oriented higher education system. The state control model overlooks the crucial 
issue of the costs of acquiring knowledge for the sake of creating innovations. It forgets that in 
a multi-level system general knowledge is usually more economically acquired by higher level 
decision-making units, while specific knowledge is more easily and more cheaply acquired by 
lower level units. And it forgets that, by introducing rigid and detailed procedures of hierarchical 
control, it cuts itself off from the possible knowledge advantages of the lower level decision-
making units and thereby loses a large innovative potential.  
“... the effectiveness of hierarchical subordination varies with the extent to which the 
subordinate unit has knowledge advantages over the higher unit. In those cases where the 
subordinate unit has better information, then in terms of the whole decision-making process 
the knowledge is one place and the power is another; the quality of decisions suffers as a 
result. Moreover, subordination itself becomes illusory to the extent that the lower level unit 
can use its knowledge to evade, counteract, or redirect the thrust of orders from its nominal 
superiors” (Sowell, 1980, p. 13, 14). 
Compared to the model of state control, the state supervising model seems to offer a better fit. 
This model seems to be better equipped to be used as a general incitement towards 
innovations in a higher education system. It addresses these systems while taking the 
fundamental characteristics of higher education institutions seriously. It leaves sufficient room 
for the (semi-)autonomous professionals and basic units and it does not try to coordinate the 
large variety of a higher education system in a limited set of rules. 
By enlarging the autonomy of the higher education institutions and by limiting itself to 
monitoring some ‘critical' system variables and to (not too often and not too drastically) 
adapting some general ‘rules of the game', government may find in this model an important 
approach which may both stimulate the innovativeness of a higher education system and 
secure its basic values and practices. I H S — Van Vught / Higher Education Policy — 45 
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